Saturday, July 26, 2008

Prosper.com - collections - you have forsaken lenders

Collections on late prosper.com loans are getting worse. Prosper simply doesn't take their responsibility to lenders seriously. Along the way there have been words from Prosper saying they were going to improve this or that, but they've all been hollow. Ding ding .. nobody's home.

Here's the latest data on collections performance, direct from prosper.com. Most late Prosper loans are sent to the collection agency Amsher. To keep things simple, I've graphed only Amsher's performance here. I've shown the fraction of loans sent to Amsher that have been cured. These numbers come directly from Prosper's web site, with no manipulation whatsoever. Prosper breaks this statistic down into three categories, according to credit grade, and that's what you see in the graph.

Prosper/Amsher late loan "cured" Fraction

Prosper switched to Amsher, and dumped a bunch of loans on them, on 2/23/08, so of course the fraction of those loans that Amsher had cured on that date was zero. It took a couple of months for the stats to recover from that initial impulse, and to climb the learning curve, in other words learning how to collect Prosper loans. Well, according to this data, the honymoon is over. Since 6/1/08 Amsher's stats have been going down.

It wouldn't be so bad if there had ever been any good performance here, but Amsher never did anything good (according to the stats Prosper.com has published).

In fact, according to Prosper's stats, Amsher has never done as good as Penncro, the collection agency it replaced. Now how the heck can that be? In some of my earlier posts on this subject I've included a graph showing combined Penncro+Amsher performance. This is the all-time performance of loans worked on by either or both. This representation eliminates the startup impulse problem in the above graph. However, it involves some manipulation of the data, which confuses some folk. Here's an update on that graph:

Prosper collections rates 07/26/08

This curve changes from blue to red when the handoff from Penncro to Amsher occurred. As you can see, Penncro got up to over 17% cured, and Amsher has been mostly downhill from there. As the number of loans handled by Amsher has increased, their lower cure rate has started really pulling down the combined curve. The explanation of how the data is combined can be found here.

How (expletive deleted) could things be this bad? Prosper management has made comments over the past few months about how collection statistics are improving. The stats Prosper.com gives us, on the other hand, are getting worse. What's the deal?

I put this question to Prosper management in mid-June. They said they'd have to look into the numbers and get back to me. I'm sure they ment to do just that, but no answers have been forthcoming. Perhaps higher priorities intervened. Ain't it always the way.

One possibility is that the numbers Prosper displays on the web site may be faulty. It wouldn't be the first time. Prosper used to display a statistic they called "net collected". There's still a row with this label on the web site, but they no longer fill in the numbers. I used to graph this statistic vs time, and as a result, I knew it was ... well ... I suppose the polite word is "bogus". This was discussed at length in the old prosper.com forum. Here's a chart I made about a year ago:

Prosper collections rates 2007-07-02

The red curve jerked up and down faster than was physically possible. From that I knew it was bogus. Prosper never did admit there was a problem. They just deleted the statistic from their web site. Well maybe that is an admission.

With that precedent in mind, is it possible that the collection statistics they provide for us now are just wrong? I don't know. I look forward to some feedback from inside Prosper.

If the numbers correctly reflect collection activity, then how the hell could it be that they are so horrible? When a loan goes 1 month late, I'd expect it to recover a significant fraction of the time. Amsher's 6% is not my idea of a significant fraction of the time. In fact, I'd expect more than 6% of 1-month-late loans to recover all by themselves, without any collection activity at all.

Something is horribly wrong.

Nobody seems to be doing anything about it. Seems like nobody cares.

Prosper, you have forsaken us (lenders).

See my prior writings on this subject, including:
Written 05/06/07: Collections is broken
Written 05/04/08: Collections is not improving

Update 08/08/2008: Just got a note from Prosper saying they have found and corrected a major bug in the way they were calculating the collection statistics they present on the web site, and believe that there is an additional problem, for which they are continuing to search. So... It looks like the data they were giving us was indeed faulty.

Friday, July 4, 2008

Prosper.com - 07/01/08 late loan stats update

Here's the July 1st update to to my late loan statistics charts.

These charts show statistics for the performance of all prosper.com loans. Each curve represents the set of loans that were created in one calendar month. The vertical axis is the fraction of those loans that have "gone bad", in other words are 1 month late or worse (up to and including default). The horizontal axis is the observation date. All data comes from Prosper.com's performance web page.

A larger, more readable version of that chart can be found here

06/01/08 small late loan chart

Here's a chart of the same data in which each curve has been slid to the left to a common origin. The horizontal axis is now days since loan origination month.

5/15/08 slid

Explanation of methodology can be found in my prior postings in this blog.

An important factor in prosper.com loan results is how well Prosper collects the payments due on these loans once have become late. Please see my prior writings on that subject, including:

Written 05/06/07: Collections is broken
Written 05/04/08: Collections is not improving

PS: The best discussion among Prosper.com lenders can be found at http://prospers.org/

Wednesday, June 25, 2008

Prosper.com - lender lawsuit

A group of prosper.com lenders has retained counsel, and started the process to take legal action against prosper.com, with the letter copied below. While I have not signed on to this letter or this action at this time, I do agree with much of what they have to say. There is a considerable overlap between the issues raised in this letter and the issues I have been writing about for the last 2 years. The letter, sent by the group's legal counsel to Prosper on June 3, 2008, asked for a response by June 24, 2008. Apparently prosper chose not to respond.

The group has made public this first letter to Prosper, and I am copying its contents below.


June 3, 2008

Edward A. GiedGowd, Esq.
Chief Compliance Officer and General Counsel
PROSPER MARKETPLACE, INC.
111 Sutter St, 22nd Floor
San Francisco, CA 94104-4540
Phone: (415) 593-5418
Fax: (415) 362-7233
e-mail:

RE: INCREASED RISKS OF LOSS AND ACTUAL LOSSES CAUSED BY PROSPER'S FAILURES

Dear Mr. Giedgowd:

I represent a group of Prosper lenders who are frustrated about the platform and its nonresponsiveness to lender concerns. This letter summarizes these lenders’ major concerns, and proposals for addressing them. This letter is sent with the hope that these issues will be resolved quickly and informally.

I. Failure to Provide Accurate Information About Risks Presented By Certain Locations or Types of Loans

It has become apparent to lenders that Prosper has permitted loans to originate in states where it cannot or will not make meaningful efforts to collect on late loans. Prosper has not informed lenders of the difference in debt collection laws of the various states, nor how Prosper permits these different laws to impact its performance of its fiduciary duties to lenders. Prosper apparently is also more interested in pursuing collections on larger loans than on smaller loans. Prosper has not informed lenders that the difference in state laws, or in Prosper’s own collection practices, may impact Prosper’s fiduciary duty to collect lenders’ funds in the event of delinquency, or that sales of those loans upon default may result in lower prices.

This information, and any other information Prosper has collected about trends from various states or types of loans or that is otherwise material to a lender’s decision to bid on a listing, must be provided to lenders.

II. Poor Collections Results

Lenders have been expressing concern about the extremely poor collection performance for more than a year. (See, for example, http://www.prospers.org/blogs/media/blogs/Fred93/open letter number 2.pdf.) Adding to that concern is the lack of any information – specific or general – about the status of collections on particular loans. My clients have not been furnished with any information about efforts to collect on their late loans, including whether the collection agency has even successfully contacted the delinquent borrowers. This is unacceptable. Prosper, as my clients’ loan servicer, must immediately amend its policies and procedures to provide lenders with specific information about the efforts made to collect on the loans, including the borrowers’ stated intent with respect to repayment. That information must be provided along with all other data about loan payments.

If a borrower has sent a “cease and desist” letter to the collection agency, Prosper must assume responsibility for collections, and for informing lenders of the status of those efforts.

In addition, lenders have repeatedly raised concerns about “blenders,” borrowers who are also lenders, with late loans. The LRA, and all other appropriate legal documents, must be amended immediately to provide Prosper with the right to withhold payments due to blenders whose loans are more than fifteen days late, and apply those payments to the blenders’ overdue loan balances. Prosper already promised lenders in writing on March 2, 2007 that "If one of them defaults, we'll find a way to take the gains from the borrower's lending portfolio and give it to lenders on their loan." Demand is hereby made that Prosper rectify its breach of this promise by paying the lenders on every such loan their pro rata portion of the blender's own lending account that should have been, but wasn't, given to them when the blender defaulted.

III. Failure to Sell Defaulted Loans

My clients are dismayed by the increasingly large portfolio of non performing loans on the platform, and Prosper’s refusal to sell them. The LRA currently states:

Except in the case of borrower bankruptcy, Notes that become over 120 days past due are charged off and offered for sale to an unaffiliated debt buyer authorized and willing to purchase consumer loans. You authorize Prosper to offer for sale and sell your Notes that become over 120 days past due to a debt buyer in accordance with this Section. Because debt purchasers buy many past due Notes at once, Notes that are in default might not be offered for sale at the point at which they are exactly 120 days past due, but may remain unsold for some period after they are 120 days past due.

Many lenders have loans that are eight or nine months past due, or more. The older these loans become, the less they are worth – and the more likely the borrowers are to file for bankruptcy. Prosper controls the timing of the debt sales, and does not appear to be abiding by the terms of the LRA.

It is particularly troubling that one offer to purchase a delinquent loan at twice what the junk debt buyer ultimately paid was unjustifiably rejected by Prosper. That demonstrates that Prosper may not be putting its lenders' interests first, as Prosper's fiduciary duties to its lenders require it to do. Demand is hereby made that Prosper immediately sell all loans that are delinquent by more than 120 days, unless the borrower has made a payment of at least one month’s principal and interest in the prior thirty days, or there is some other individualized reason that Prosper reasonably believes that holding that loan out of the debt sale is in the lenders' best interests. That reason must be disclosed to lenders. In addition, demand is hereby made that Prosper reimburse each and every lender on loan 4018 the money that Prosper's improper rejection of the high bid for that defaulting loan cost them. If Prosper wishes to accept a low bid, rather than a higher bid, then Prosper, not the lenders, should suffer the loss caused by that decision.

Prosper’s failure to hold quarterly debt sales has resulted in clear harm to lenders. Prosper last sold defaulted loans in December, 2008, and the sales price was substantially less than at the prior sale. Prosper apparently attempted another debt sale in late April, 2008 (a month later than it should have), where the bids were substantially lower than in December. Instead of selling the loans for the best price Prosper could get (as its fiduciary duty and the LRA obligated it to do), Prosper permitted the loans to age even longer, devaluing the older debt even more, and in late May, 2008 was apparently offered less than half of what it had been offered a month earlier.

Demand is hereby made that Prosper treat all loans that were 121+ days late as of the date of the December debt sale as having been sold in March, 2008. To that end, Prosper must provide very specific detail about the debt sale proceeds received in December, 2007 and the bids made in April and May, 2008 so lenders can determine a fair price.

Prosper has recently notified lenders that the bids it received to buy defaulted loans in May were either very low or attached conditions that Prosper deemed unacceptable. Prosper must specify, in detail, the “conditions” that made the May, 2008 bids unacceptable to it, and explain why it rejected those bids. With respect to all debt sale negotiations in 2008, Prosper must disclose the identity of the debt bidders and buyers to the lenders, as well as the terms of each offer so that the lenders can verify that Prosper did, indeed, make a commercially reasonable effort to obtain the best possible price for the loans. Further, for each effort to sell the debt, Prosper must disclose to lenders the identity of each bidder and the winning bidder on past sales, and every potential debt buyer that Prosper notified of the upcoming sale in an effort to solicit bids.

In another express violation of the LRA, Prosper apparently no longer intends to hold debt sales, instead planning to have some unspecified person “apply” unspecified “charge off collection techniques” to debt that is 121+ days old. Prosper cannot unilaterally decide that it is in the lenders’ best interests despite the terms of the LRA for these loans to be subjected to “charge off collection techniques.” Instead, should Prosper wish to deviate from the terms of the LRA, Prosper must provide lenders with detail about these proposed “techniques,” including, at a minimum, what they consist of, who will “apply” them and what the cost to lenders will be. Then, Prosper must permit lenders to opt in or out of this experiment. And, in the future, Prosper must hold debt sales at least quarterly. If the current method of conducting debt sales does not provide Prosper with a mechanism to dispose of non performing loans, Prosper should investigate alternative means of debt sales, perhaps even in the form of a secondary auction on its platform, open to all qualified buyers.

IV. Failure to Prosecute “New Agency Test” Lawsuits

Last year, Prosper invited lenders to opt in or out of a series of planned lawsuits against 66 borrowers whose loans were more than four months late. The lenders who opted in to these suits have not been told whether suit has actually been filed on each of the loans. It appears that where suits have been filed, they most likely have not been served, since very few proofs of service have been filed with the courts. It therefore appears that the cases have not been litigated aggressively – or, in most cases, at all. The LRA instructs lenders not to contact Prosper’s collection law firm, yet very little information about the prosecution of these cases has been provided. Any unserved lawsuit must be served immediately, and, if service is unsuccessful, Prosper’s counsel must take prompt steps to obtain leave of court to serve the complaints via publication. If an answer is filed, Prosper should promptly evaluate the action for summary judgment.

Further, information about the status of these actions must be provided to all lenders, and updated at least monthly.

V. Failure to Protect Lenders’ Interests After A Borrower Claims to Have Declared Bankruptcy

Prosper's fiduciary duty towards its lenders requires that Prosper act in a manner that is most likely to protect the interests of lenders on loans where the borrower has filed or states their intention of filing for bankruptcy.

Prosper has admitted, in writing, to treating loan 2139 (listing number 23444) as being in bankruptcy for more than a year based solely on the borrower’s claim that she was “going to” file. Prosper did nothing to verify the borrower’s claim, and has not yet sold that loan. The loan continues to show that it is both in collections and in bankruptcy, and the lenders do not know whether it truly is. Whether or not this borrower ultimately filed a bankruptcy petition, the lenders on this loan suffered monetary damage as a result of this loan not being sold timely, both in terms of lost interest and in terms of the diminishing amount debt buyers are willing to pay for Prosper loans. Demand is hereby made that Prosper reimburse all lenders on that loan in at least the amount they would have received had the loan been sold timely, together with interest thereon.

Similarly, loans 1323 and 7107, likely among many others, show they are simultaneously in collections and in bankruptcy, suggesting that Prosper has relied solely on the borrower’s stated future intent to file. A recent PACER search did not turn up any bankruptcy filing by the borrower on loan 7107.

These loans highlight the harm caused to lenders by Prosper taking the unsubstantiated word of borrowers. While lenders are aware that Prosper intends at some unspecified future date to provide information to lenders about the petition filing date and chapter, that is inadequate. Prosper must verify that the petition has been filed, and must file all documents needed to protect the interests of the lenders. Prosper must also file appropriate documents to perfect the lenders’ claims, must challenge the dischargeability of any loan obtained fraudulently or too close in time to the bankruptcy filing, and must verify that the bankruptcy actually results in a discharge of the Prosper loan. If the bankruptcy petition is dismissed, Prosper must notify lenders of that, and promptly recommence collection activity, or sell the loan as defaulted.

Prosper must provide the following documentation of any loan in bankruptcy on the loan information pages on its website: (1) the date and chapter of the petition; (2) the steps Prosper has taken to protect the lenders’ interests; (3) the status of the bankruptcy; and (4) whether the bankruptcy has been discharged. Prosper must also provide lenders with a detailed summation of the adversary proceedings or other challenges it has made, and the outcome of those filings.

If no bankruptcy petition has been filed, of course, Prosper and its agents must continue collection efforts on the lenders’ behalf. Borrowers should not be permitted to avoid collection efforts and their repayment obligations while they consider how best to address their financial situation, as this is to the lenders’ clear detriment. Prosper must treat all loans as being delinquent until it is furnished with paperwork from the Court establishing that a bankruptcy petition has truly been filed.

VI. Failure to Honor Repurchase Guarantee

Lenders have identified cases of apparent identity theft after loans go late. One example is Listing No. 102017, where the borrower represented himself to be a woman who had a credit history extending back 12 years and a six-figure income. In reality, the borrower was a 22 year old man. Prosper inexplicably refused to honor its identity theft guarantee on this loan. Please honor that guarantee immediately.

Additionally, there are many loans where the borrower never made even one payment, or where a borrower made two or fewer payments. Prosper must diligently investigate potential identity theft with respect to those loans (which include, without limitation, the loans resulting from listings 102580, 137658, 140191, 179350 and 208191) and advise the lenders on those loans, with specificity, about the outcome of the investigations. If identity theft is found, Prosper must promptly honor its repurchase guarantee.

Lenders are also concerned by the fact that Prosper has essentially stopped repurchasing loans under its identity theft guarantee. To date, Prosper has repurchased 122 loans. These include the 66 New Agency Test loans and a handful of loans Prosper repurchased due to credit data issues. Thus, roughly fifty loans were repurchased by Prosper for other reasons (which we presume include the identity theft guarantee). Prosper has repurchased only one loan that originated after August 1, 2007 despite the fact that more than 40% of all Prosper's loans originated after that date. It is extremely unlikely that there has only been one identity theft loan in all that time; it is far more likely that the near complete absence of repurchases is due to the "success" of Prosper's strenuous efforts since last summer to deprive lenders of the information they formerly used to discover numerous fraudulent and identity theft loans on their own. As you know, many of the loans Prosper repurchased were identified by lenders through discussions on Prosper's own forums, before Prosper eliminated those forums and stripped basic information from the listings. Because Prosper knows that its conduct has severely impaired the ability of lenders to ferret out fraud, it has a fiduciary duty to increase its own efforts to determine whether the listing was fraudulent in any manner. Instead of fulfilling that duty, it appears that Prosper may have used this as an opportunity to cease having to spend its own capital repurchasing fraudulent loans. Please be aware that we intend to vigorously pursue discovery on this and other topics should further action be required to protect lenders' interests.

VII. Failure to Protect Lenders From Other Instances of Borrower Fraud

Prosper’s fiduciary duty requires Prosper to protect lenders from garden variety fraud, as well. That includes borrowers who take out loans with no intention of repaying them, such as the loan resulting from Listing 71273, which funded after lenders warned Prosper that the borrower had posted his lack of intent to repay the loan as well as admitting that he lied about the purpose of the loan. Not surprisingly, after Prosper permitted this loan to fund, the borrower defaulted.

Prosper must investigate all listings reported as fraudulent. Prosper must investigate all reports of suspected fraud before permitting loans to fund. Listings 18121 and 71273 provide but two examples of loans that originated despite many well supported reports of suspected fraud, then subsequently defaulted. Demand is hereby made for a full explanation of Prosper's investigation (or lack thereof) of these reports of fraud on these listings, and why Prosper believes (if it does) that its investigation was "commercially reasonable" as required by the Lender Registration Agreement (“LRA”). Needless to say, if Prosper's investigation was not commercially reasonable, Prosper must reimburse all lenders on these loans (and any other loans that were permitted to fund despite reports of fraud) for their losses.

VIII. Failure to Provide Accurate Performance Information

Prosper misrepresents the value of lenders’ portfolios, both on each lender’s individual overview page and on its Marketplace Performance page. On the lending overview page, the interest rate is artificially inflated since it does not take into account the lack of interest actually paid on late loans. Prosper could easily correct this misleading information, since at least two third party sites (www.lendingstats.com and www.ericscc.com) provide more accurate – and significantly lower - estimated rates of return than does Prosper.

With collections remaining at less than 20%, Prosper must adjust the manner in which it reports account values to lenders. A loan that is four months late is worth significantly less to a lender than one that is two days late. Loans in bankruptcy likely have no value. Despite this, Prosper portrays all loans, regardless of their status, at full face value, including accrued interest and late fees, which substantially overstates the portfolio's real value. Prosper must provide lenders with more accurate loan valuation.

Prosper must immediately cease providing lenders with inflated interest rate data and inflated loan valuations. Prosper must disclose the number of bankruptcies on the lender overview page, and must value them accordingly. Once a loan goes more than thirty days late, it must be valued in the lenders' portfolios at the discounted value that represents the probability of curing. Loans that are subject to a debt sale (+4 month loans) should be valued in lenders’ portfolios at no more than the proceeds obtained for a loan of that nature in the previous debt sale. If a loan is charged off it must be treated as having no value.

Similarly, Prosper must provide accurate information on its Marketplace Performance page, which it invites lenders to use “to figure out what kinds of borrowers will yield the highest return for your portfolio.” The data there is inaccurate, due, at least in part, to matters noted above. The failure to hold timely debt sales distorts that data, since loans that should be counted as defaults are instead counted as 4+ month lates. In addition, the New Agency Test loans are erroneously treated by Prosper as if they had never originated. Since these loans are by definition "defaults" in everything but name (indeed, for the lenders opting out of the New Agency Test, these loans are defaults, since these lenders were paid the pennies on the dollar that these loans would have received had they been sold at the last junk debt sale), they should be treated as defaults for all reporting purposes. Loans that Prosper charges off must be clearly identified on the Marketplace Performance page, as well, and must be treated as having no value for purposes of ROI calculations and lender bidding guidance. Under no circumstances shall "charged off" loans be treated like the New Agency Test loans are currently treated (i.e., as if they had never originated). Not surprisingly, Prosper’s actual results are substantially worse than reported. These misrepresentations must be corrected, and only correct data posted in the future.

X. Retroactive Changes to Terms of Service, to the Detriment of Lenders

Prosper has repeatedly amended the LRA and terms of service, until recently not even notifying lenders of such changes (much less obtaining lenders' consent). Needless to say, Prosper has no authority to unilaterally amend any agreement governing the relationship between the parties, particularly in a retroactive fashion.

One change that resulted in significant lender concern was Prosper’s unilateral decision to permit borrowers to obtain second loans without having paid off their first loans. Several lenders advised Prosper that the terms of service permitted only one loan at a time, and this change presented real increased risk. Prosper was urged to permit second loans only on first loans that originated after this change, and notification to lenders, so lenders could decide for themselves whether they wanted to assume this much greater risk. Prosper ignored the likely risk to lenders, and declined to permit second loans only on first loans that were listed after the amendments. Thus, lenders who bid with the certain knowledge that Prosper would only allow one loan at a time were suddenly faced with additional risk. Many lenders would not have made loans in the first instance had they known that Prosper might later permit second loans because of the additional risk.

This additional risk is evident with borrower "dbfunding," who first borrowed $15,000 (listing 29537), then, after second loans were permitted, borrowed another $14,650 (listing 228201). The loans now show they are in bankruptcy. At least with respect to those lenders who have not implicitly acquiesced to the new terms of service by continuing to lend, Prosper must immediately repurchase the first loan. When any similar situation arises in the future, whether the first loan defaults or files for bankruptcy, Prosper must immediately reimburse all lenders who have not loaned since the changes in the terms of service.

Prosper unilaterally decided to move collections away from Penncro to AmSher, which charges lenders a higher fee. At the time of this switch, Prosper promised that lenders would not be charged more than they would have been had the loans remained at Penncro. After it was pointed out to Prosper that notwithstanding its promise, lenders were actually being charged the higher AmSher fees, Prosper stated that this was due to a "coding error," and that Prosper would reimburse lenders the over charges. Apparently, no such reimbursement has yet occurred, despite months having passed. Demand is hereby made that Prosper immediately provide that reimbursement to lenders.

Prosper unquestionably has a fiduciary duty to lenders, which it has breached in many respects. The foregoing are areas where breaches have clearly and repeatedly occurred, and which must promptly be addressed to avoid litigation. I look forward to your written response, with the specific steps with which Prosper will address these concerns, by June 24, 2008.

cc: John B. Witchel
Christian A. Larsen
Kirk T. Inglis
James W. Breyer
Lawrence W. Cheng
Paul M. Hazen


A pdf scanned image of the letter can be found at http://p2pla.org/docs/4187_001.pdf

Discussion of all issues related to prosper.com can be found at http://www.prospers.org

Monday, June 16, 2008

Prosper.com - 06/15/08 late loan stats update

Here's the mid-June update to to my late loan statistics charts.

These charts show statistics for the performance of all prosper.com loans. Each curve represents the set of loans that were created in one calendar month. The vertical axis is the fraction of those loans that have "gone bad", in other words are 1 month late or worse (up to and including default). The horizontal axis is the observation date. All data comes from Prosper.com's performance web page.

A larger, more readable version of that chart can be found here

06/01/08 small late loan chart

Here's a chart of the same data in which each curve has been slid to the left to a common origin. The horizontal axis is now days since loan origination month.

5/15/08 slid

Explanation of methodology can be found in my prior postings in this blog .

An important factor in prosper.com loan results is how well Prosper collects the payments due on these loans. Please see my prior writings on that subject, including:

Written 05/06/07: Collections is broken

Written 05/04/08: Collections is not improving

PS: The best discussion among Prosper.com lenders can be found at http://prospers.org/

Tuesday, June 3, 2008

Prosper.com - 06/01/08 late loan stats update

Here's the June update to to my late loan statistics charts.

These charts show statistics for the performance of all prosper.com loans. Each curve represents the set of loans that were created in one calendar month. The vertical axis is the fraction of those loans that have "gone bad", in other words are 1 month late or worse (up to and including default). The horizontal axis is the observation date. All data comes from Prosper.com's performance web page.

A larger, more readable version of that chart can be found here

06/01/08 small late loan chart

Here's a chart of the same data in which each curve has been slid to the left to a common origin. The horizontal axis is now days since loan origination month.

5/15/08 slid

Explanation of methodology can be found in my prior postings in this blog .

You can plainly see that Prosper loans are going bad at about 20% per year. Just look at the 360 day point on that last chart. As I've reported before, you will see many references in various newspaper and magazine articles that the Prosper loan default rate is 3% per year. These statements are just completely wrong. It is amazing how often this incorrect statement has been reprinted. Prosper's own data (as seen above) shows the correct number is about 20%/year.

The most recent repeat of the lie can be found in Lendoza's blog
http://www.lendoza.com/2008/05/28/marketplace-protection-collections-a-closer-look/ where he wrote:

we will assume that Prosper's numbers are accurate?.in which case there is a default rate of 3%

He obviously hasn't actually looked at the data. He must have simply copied that from one of the newspaper articles. Prosper's data does NOT show "a default rate of 3%". The only polite word for that is "wrong".

Zcommodore recently showed us another way to look at this same data.

http://www.prospers.org/blogs/zcommodore/2008/05/22/loan_aging_a_study_of_loans_over_time

You can read from his graphs a default rate of a little less than 2%/month. That's about the same as 20%/year I've repeatedly described.

An important factor in prosper.com loan results is how well Prosper collects the payments due on these loans. Please see my prior writings on that subject, including:

Written 05/06/07: Collections is broken

Written 05/04/08: Collections is not improving

Prosper has recently advised us that the most recent auction of old bad loans has failed, and as a result they no longer intend to auction off old bad loans. Failed. Dead. Nobody wants to buy the stuff! As a result of this, Prosper has told us that they intend to stop selling such loans, and instead apply "post charge-off collection techniques" while us lenders still own the loans.

This could be a very positive development. The old auction/sale process was very bad for lenders, as no one ever tried very hard to collect before the loans were sold, and the sale triggered very bad tax consequences for lenders. As I wrote about a year ago in Collections is broken I think this is an appropriate thing to do ... IF Prosper takes this responsibility seriously.

My concern, and the concern of many other lenders, is that Prosper will not take it seriously, as they have never taken their responsibility to lenders with any seriousness. I recently wrote about how slowly Prosper is proceeding with the legal test against 66 deadbeat borrowers. Will they proceed more gusto against 1000 or 2000? Or does "post charge-off collection techniques" mean letting old loans gather dust on a back shelf?

PS: The best discussion among Prosper.com lenders can be found at http://prospers.org/

Saturday, May 24, 2008

Prosper.com - a mishandled loan

This summary is not available. Please click here to view the post.

Sunday, May 18, 2008

Prosper.com - here's what you should do with the lawyers

When we invest in prosper.com loans, we make a deal with prosper. The lender buys the loan, and prosper retains the right to service the loan and charge a fee for that service. This would be fine if prosper did a good job of servicing loans, but they don't.

Don't get me wrong. Prosper has done many things right. The idea was great. They built an incredible web site. They just don't service loans well, which unfortunately is a critical thing.

In any other situation I can imagine, if I owned a loan, I could decide who services the loan. That way there would be competition. If my loan servicing guy proved to be incompetent, I could move to another loan servicing guy. This sort of competition drives everyone to be serious and pay attention to business. (Economics 101)

If you're locked in to one loan servicing guy, then what's his incentive to actually care about your loan?

In the case of Prosper, you might think the incentive would be that their survival ultimately depends on this. If, over time, the world learns that their product is bad, then no one will want their product. I'm not the only one who has said things like this.

John Witchel (Prosper CTO) wrote (in private correspondence) on 05/09/2007:

Prosper is heavily motivated to keep defaults in line. If they aren't tractable everyone's returns go to the dogs and Prosper fails, and there's no amount of "new blood" that will keep that problem at bay

Today 3,215 of Prosper's loans have gone in the toilet (ITT). I'm counting loans that have defaulted, as well as loans that are at least 2 months late, which by past Prosper performance means they will almost certainly end in default. In other words, these are loans where the lenders have been stiffed.

Prosper has originated 18,819 loans that are now at least 3 months old (ie old enough to be at least 2 months late). For the record, those 3,215 loans in the toilet are 17.1% of Prosper's total 18,819 loans old enough to be ITT. (Gosh I hope I don't read any more of those newspaper articles that say Prosper has a default rate of 3%.)

(You can get all these numbers for yourself from Prosper's performance web page, or from one of the third party stats sites, etc.)

But that 17.1% is not the really interesting fraction. Prosper has insulated itself from the loan-making decision, so some would say the high default rate is not entirely Prosper's fault. Read on.

For almost all of those late loans, all Prosper ever did was send the borrowers emails and phone calls, asking them to pay. In other words, Prosper did almost nothing. To be certain, there have been some small improvements. For example here's an improvement announced earlier this year:

Doug fuller quote (from prosper blog)...
http://blog.prosper.com/2008/01/04/doug-fuller-on-collections-1/

One of the many activities aimed at improving collections undertaken in the last couple of months was the testing and implementation of an ?Early Delinquency? letter series. Although borrowers were already receiving reminder emails and phone calls during the early delinquency period (1 -30 days past due), we thought it worth seeing if an actual letter might drive additional payments.

Oh boy! Now they send a letter. An improvement. But ... Frankly, a letter ain't much, and Prosper's collections is still super-wimpy. Prosper management just doesn't take this stuff seriously. They don't take handling your money seriously.

When Prosper was conceived, the founders didn't realize that bad loans, deadbeat borrowers, defaults and collections would be such a bad problem. They had a notion, now proven to be incorrect, that the "community" aspects of Prosper would create loans which went bad at a lower rate than other consumer loans, credit cards, etc. That aspect was widely hyped to lenders. (Remember those web pages where they talked about Joe the fireman, and how after he joined the fireman's Prosper group he would feel an obligation to all other firemen, so would keep his loan current?) Turns out: It ain't so.

I don't fault the founders for getting this wrong. In every startup the founders envision some future business, an act which forces them to predict how the future will turn out. As the saying goes "Predicting is really difficult. Especially the future." Some part of the vision is always wrong. You have to adapt. Prosper management hasn't adapted.

(And for the record, I still believe there is value in the community aspects of Prosper. Its untapped. I'll write about that in a future blog.)

To be fair, they have made changes which attempt to reduce the rate at which loans go bad. They added a post card to verify the address of the borrower. They increased the lower bound on credit score for HR borrowers, to cut off some of the really bad credit risks. Finally they added bidding guidance in an attempt to scare naive lenders away from high risk loans. Good stuff... but no real improvements in the collections department, where thousands of loans sit rotting.

Because the Prosper founders didn't think collections would be much of a problem, they didn't devise a good method to fund collection activities. The existing legal documents (lender agreement, borrower agreement) don't provide mechanisms that would fund legal action against borrowers, even when it is clearly in the interest of lenders. In other words, we have lenders willing to pay for action, but Prosper unable to act. Prosper could have adapted, and changed these agreements, inventing the new mechanisms to fund the functions they now saw were needed, but they have not. They're still tryin' to run collections on the cheap.

More discussion about funding collections can be found in my Open letter #2 to Prosper management, written almost exactly a year ago. Much of it is still on point.

Lets get back to those 3,215 loans in the toilet. 1,458 of those have already defaulted, ie were sold to junk dealers, so they're gone, and there's nothing we can do about them. The remaining 1,757 in the toilet loans are still in Prosper's hands, and they could do something about those, if they had the desire to act.

They have taken some action, but I want to show you how tiny that action is. Back in January '08, Prosper started a "legal test" where they took 66 very late loans, in California only, and initiated legal action. Oh boy! There are several small problems.

First, that's 66 out of (1757+66) = 3.6% ! They only initiated legal action against 3.6% of the late loans in their hands that are in the toilet.

Are you a lender on some of the other 96.4%? Sorry. Your loans are going to default. Nothing is being done. The "legal test" should be 10 times larger.

Second, I said they "initiated" legal action, but that's almost too strong a word. Remember the project started in January. In May they filed the first "proof of service" documents with some of the courts, meaning that the complaints have actually just now been served against some of these deadbeats. Slooow. No requests for summary judgement have yet been filed. No court dates have yet been set. If we run at this pace, it will take a year before we have any results. During that time, more thousands of loans will default due to Prosper's inaction. This is irresponsible. This may be the most economical way to proceed, but it is not the most responsible.

Here's my request of Prosper's management:

You have, in your hands, 1,272 loans that are 4+ late. (For the record some of this group are as much as 10 months late, such as loan #901.) Establish objective criteria to pick half of those loans that are worthy of legal action, in other words about 660 loans, ten times the size of the existing legal test, and begin legal action on them immediately. Take lenders, and your obligations to them, seriously.

Make the changes in the legal documents required to allow you to fund this legal activity while complying with the terms of the documents. This won't help you for the existing loans, but at least it gets you straight with the lawyers for future loans.

Oh, and please make the process transparent.

Saturday, May 17, 2008

Prosper.com - 05/15/08 late loan stats update

Here's the mid-May update to to my late loan statistics charts.

These charts show statistics for the performance of all prosper.com loans. Each curve represents the set of loans that were created in one calendar month. The vertical axis is the fraction of those loans that have "gone bad", in other words are 1 month late or worse (up to and including default). The horizontal axis is the observation date. All data comes from Prosper.com's performance web page.

A larger, more readable version of that chart can be found here

5/15/08 small late loan chart

Here's a chart of the same data in which each curve has been slid to the left to a common origin. The horizontal axis is now days since loan origination month.

5/15/08 slid

Explanation of methodology can be found in my prior postings in this blog .

An important factor in prosper.com loan results is how well Prosper collects the payments due on these loans. Please see my prior writings on that subject, including:

Written 05/06/07: Collections is broken

Written 05/04/08: Collections is not improving

Tuesday, May 6, 2008

Prosper.com - the lawsuits begin

Grant Wanapat, Jerald Teixeira, Holly Brown, Valentino Raboteaux, Ricardo Barboza, Crystal Moffett, Shi Li Park, Louis Collet, Robert Riviera, Christopher Carr, Chinyere Woke, Carlos Delgado, Diana Davis, Victoria Crawford, Mario Villanueva, Brandi Fitzgerald, Josephine Sharaba, Jermaine Massey, Teresita Spreen, Karen Rozier, Coleen Alexadria Dacey, Krag Pappas, Teresa Calvert, Lovel Hoxie, Deniece Todd, Kimberly Jones, Vickie Brown, Michelle Wiese, Rory Manning, Jeremy Brom, Lynn Horton, Del Phillips, Mark Dionne, Chona Dionne, Oscar Monge, Gregory Kolesar, Roger Treskunoff, Lavina Lewis, S. White ***

Question: What do these people have in common?

Answer: They have all been sued by Prosper.com, for not paying back their loans.

I have good news and bad news for lenders.

The good news is that legal action is finally happening. We've waited a long long time for this, and its good to finally see some serious action against deadbeats who have stiffed us. Prosper's collection activity up to this point has consisted of phone calls, with the recently added modern technological innovation of a letter asking deadbeats to repay.

The bad news is that the legal test project is very small, and is moving at a snail's pace. Lets review the schedule, so you can see what I mean.

01/15/08 -- Prosper sent many lenders an email message asking them to "opt in" to this project to allow Prosper to sue borrowers on the lenders behalf. I opted in.

02/17/08 -- Prosper repurchased the loans from lenders, to simplify court proceedings. Prosper didn't pay anything to the folks who opted in. Payment will come later, depending on success in the lawsuits.

02/25/08 -- First suit filed. In Riverside county. Prosper vs Cline
02/26/08 -- Second suit filed. In Orange County. Prosper vs Rozier

Its now 05/06/08 and neither of those two cases has yet had proof of service filed with the court. You can't get very far until you tell the court that you have served the complaint to the defendant!

A great many more cases were filed 04/01/08, and a few more later in April.

So after starting the project on 01/15/08, four months later we only have proof of service for one defendant. That's movin' kinda slow. How many months must we wait to serve the other 65 defendants?

If the very first step takes four months, imagine how long the other steps are gonna take! In what year might we have verdicts? We have to move more aggressively than this.

Second problem is that Prosper is only suing 66 nonpaying borrowers in this project. They think of it as a test. If it goes well, maybe they'll do more someday. Today there are 1187 more Prosper loans that are more than 4 months past due (not counting the 66 in this test). These loans are on a fast track to nowheresville. If Prosper follows its standard procedure, these 1187 loans will be auctioned off for pennies on the dollar. This could happen to the majority of them within days.

Pennies on the dollar ain't good. In a recent note from Doug Fuller to lenders, he told us that the bids he received on the current set of 4+ late loans was about 1/3 the price they've received in earlier auctions. That means $0.03 or $0.04 on the dollar I think. This $0.03 or so is what lenders are going to get for most bad Prosper loans for the foresable future, because the legal test program is tiny tiny tiny, and slow slow slow.

Doing a "test" for a year or so on a small number of loans sounds prudent if its not your money that was lent and is now being washed down the drain. If it is your money, you have a different view. Prosper has simply never taken collections seriously. The lawers need to put some of these cases in high gear. Get them served for heaven sake! Learn what we need to learn in a few cases, and then greatly expand the program. This must be done, because the status quo sucks.

You can't be a successful loan company if you don't try real hard to get borrowers to pay the money back. "Try real hard" doesn't mean "phone calls and one letter". Most of Prosper's management effort is focused on making a better website, or "Are we a Web 2.0 company?" (the title of a real session at Prosper Days '08 ... I kid you not). Get real. You're a loan company. Your success depends on the value of your product.

*** This is not a complete set of names of folks being sued by Prosper. I obtained these names by looking up the suits in public court records in the large counties of California. You may obtain this information, and also status of each case from the county court websites.

Sunday, May 4, 2008

Prosper.com - collections is not improving

Prosper's biggest hangnail is the fact that its loans perform so poorly. One aspect of this is collections. Once a Prosper loan goes 1 month late, the loan is sent to collections, and it almost always defaults. If you can't collect, then Prosper loans aren't worth much.

Collections performance has improved at various times, but it has been stagnant for the last 3 months.

Prosper/Penncro/Amsher "brought current" Fraction

I've graphed a simple ratio. The denominator is the total number of loans Prosper has sent to collections (over all time up to the observation date) and the numerator is the total number of loans which became current after going into collections. I have included only loans sent to Penncro and Amsher, because historically those are the numbers I collected daily from Prosper's web site. I never had much interest in the other collection agencies, because they never were given more than a handful of loans. The color of the curve changes on the day (2/23/08) that Prosper fired Penncro and moved all the in-collections loans to Amsher.

When the curve bends upward, it means that recent performance is better than historical, and is thereby pulling up this all-time average number. When the curve is flat there is no improvement. It is -- most recently -- flat.

I started complaining about Prosper's collections operation back when the numbers were around 6%. That's really a ridiculously low number! Its amazing how much flak I got at the time. Several know-it-all lenders told me that collecting on Prosper loans was inherently impossible. "Can't get blood from a turnip." etc. I never believed that. I believed that Prosper's operations were simply not competent. Over time it became clear that with a lot of pushing from vocal lenders, Prosper did pay more attention and roughly doubled this measure of collections performance during early 2007.

By spring 2008 the curve levelled off again, as Prosper stopped paying attention.

Sometime around mid-September of 2007, Prosper hired Doug Fuller to head operations, which means "taking care of your loans". After Doug arrived, the curve started heading up again. October thru December of 2007 were great months. It looked like Doug was able to make Penncro perform much better than they did before. I called that bend in the curve in Nov'07 the "Doug Fuller bend".

Eventually Doug expressed displeasure with Penncro. As a result, he hired a new company, Amsher, in February 2008. Now from everything I've read about Amsher, they seem like a great company. You should read their web page. Unfortunately, about the time Prosper's collections business moved from Penncro to Amsher, performance sagged. The curve is now once again horizontal. This means that Amsher's performance is around 17.5%, simply matching the all-time historical norm. Stagnation. Bummer. There has been no explanation of this from Prosper.

Doug Fuller occasionally posts a collections status update in the official Prosper blog. These generally have a postive message, like things are improving, and some ad-hoc statistics that you can't verify. For example, in the most recent update, he talked about dollars per loan per month being recovered. For example, we have no idea what loans he counted in that denominator. He described this number as higher than in the past, but depending on which loans he counted, this may not have been a fair comparison between Penncro and Amsher. I think my presentation makes more sense.

Background reading:

Over a year ago I wrote an open letter to Prosper about the collections problem. Some of it is a little dated, but the main ideas are still correct. You can read it here: Open Letter #2

Doug Fuller gave a lengthy talk on Prosper's collections at ProsperDays'08. You can watch it here: PD08 Collections Video

Technical notes: I left this part for the end, because most people aren't interested in the details.

When lenders attempt to understand collections performance, they face several difficulties. Prosper publishes collections statistics, but these statistics are not very helpful when we try to compare two collection agencies. You may have noted that Amsher's "brought current" percentages are all lower than Penncro's numbers were. Why? One reason is that the characteristics of the pile of loans they're working on are different. Penncro got loans that were freshly late, whereas Amsher started with a pile of loans that had been sitting around Penncro for several months. Its not a fair comparison. I've chosen a methodology which avoids this sort of problem.

I've generated a measure which combines the effort of all the players: Prosper, Penncro, Amsher into one number. As described above, the denominator is the count of all loans that have gone to collections, and the numerator is the count of such loans that got fixed. Simple.

Here's how I form the combined statistic.

On 2/22/08 Prosper's collections page showed us that 3348 loans had been sent to Penncro. On 2/23/08 the same page showed us that 1181 loans had arrived at Amsher. 2167 loans "disappeared" from the statistics. I asked Prosper about that, and I learned that only the "live" loans were transferred. Loans that were not actively being collected (either became current, or defaulted) were not transferred. Ok. Whatever. Sorta makes sense, but it makes it more difficult to understand history. I add those 2167 loans back to the number of loans Prosper reports as sent to Amsher. This gives me the total number of loans sent to either Penncro or Amsher, in other words, my denominator.

Forming the numerator is a similar exercise. On 2/22/08, Prosper showed that Penncro had been sent 3348 loans, and that 17.3% of these had been brought current. 17.3% * 3348 = 578 loans brought current by Penncro. From the percentages brought current that Prosper gives us for Amsher I compute the number of loans Amsher has brought current. To this I add the 578 loans brought current by Penncro, giving me total number of loans cured, in other words, my numerator.

I record several of the numbers on the Prosper collection agency web page every day, do the calculations I've described, and draw the curve.

Thursday, April 17, 2008

Prosper.com - 4/15/08 late loan stats update

Here's the mid-April update to to my late loan statistics charts.

These charts show statistics for the performance of all prosper.com loans. Each curve represents the set of loans that were created in one calendar month. The vertical axis is the fraction of those loans that have "gone bad", in other words are 1 month late or worse (up to and including default). The horizontal axis is the observation date. All data comes from Prosper.com's performance web page.

A larger, more readable version of that chart can be found here

4/1/08 small late loan chart

Explanation of methodology can be found in my prior postings in this blog, and in my postings on the old prosper.com forum archive found at http://www.prosperreport.com/

Saturday, April 5, 2008

Prosper.com - 4/1/08 late loan stats update

Here's the April update to to my late loan statistics charts.

These charts show statistics for the performance of all prosper.com loans. Each curve represents the set of loans that were created in one calendar month. The vertical axis is the fraction of those loans that have "gone bad", in other words are 1 month late or worse (up to and including default). The horizontal axis is the observation date. All data comes from Prosper.com's performance web page.

A larger, more readable version of that chart can be found here

4/1/08 small late loan chart

It does continue to look like there's a change in the quality of loans (for the better) between Oct'07 and Nov'07.

On the other hand, we've been fooled before. Earlier it looked like there was a significant change in behavior between Feb'07 and Mar'07. We thought that Mar'07 and later curves had lower slopes. As things evolved, we now see that was an illusion. Feb'07 was a worse than average month, and Mar'07 was a better than average month, so there was a visual "gap" between these two months. As we now look back on Apr'07, May'07, Jun'07 we see that these curves are very similar in slope to prior months. Loans got a little better early in '07, but the effect was slight.

Explanation of methodology can be found in my prior postings in this blog, and in my postings on the old prosper.com forum archive found at www.prosperreport.com